Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

F. William McGinn v. Utah Power and Light
Company : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James B Lee; D Frank Wilkins; Gordon L Roberts; Parsons, Behle and Latimer; Attorneys for
Respondent.
Stephen B Nebeker; Paul S Felt; Ray, Quinney and Nebeker; Sidney G Baucom; M Blaine Hofeling;
Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, F. William McGinn v. Utah Power and Light Company, No. 13619.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/798

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY

IN THE SUPREME CO&<RT1975
OF THE STATE OF U T A H - ™
BKIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY.
J. Reuben Clark Law School

F. W I L L I A M McGINN II,
Plaintiff ^Respondent,
v.

\ Case No.
13619

UTAH P O W E R & L I G H T
COMPANY, a Maine corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal From an Order of the Third District Court
In and For Salt Lake County, Utah
The Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Judge

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER
PAUL S. FELT
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
SIDNEY G. BAUCOM
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER M. BLAINE HOFEUNG
JAMES B. LEE
1407 West North Temple
D. FRANK WILKINS
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
GORDON L. ROBERTS
Attorneys for Defendant79 South State Street
Appellant.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff!j»
ti
Respondent
%& |]
.\
K«I

J U L 121974

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE

Page
1

D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT

2

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

10

P O I N T I. T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D
IN GRANTING P L A I N T I F F ' S MOTION
FOR A N E W TRIAL

10

CONCLUSION

16

AUTHORITIES CITED
Argo v. Blackshear, 416 S.W. 2d 314 (Ark. 1967) .. 13
Erb v. Mutual Service Casualty Company,
123 N.W.2d 493 (Wis. 1963)
Fehrman v. Smirl, 121 N.W.2d 255
(Wis. 1963)
Flick v. Walfinger, 198 N.W.2d
146 (Minn. 1972)
Gardner v. Germain, 117 N.W.2d 759
(Minn. 1962)

12
11
13
13

i
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
Harbison v. Briggs Bros. Paint Manufacturing
Co., 354 S.W.2d 464 (Tenn. 1962)
13
Holland v. Peterson,
Idaho
,
518 P.2d 1190 (1974)
11, 16
International Harvester Co. v. Pike,
466S.W.2d901 (Ark. 1971)
15
Johnson v. O'Brien, 105 N.W.2d 244
(Minn. 1960)
13
McCourtie v. United States Steel Corporation,
93 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1958)
13
Simpson v. Anderson, Docket No. 73-009,
Colorado Court of Appeals, 1973
15
TEXTS
Comparative Negligence Manual, Section 8.10,
chapter 8, page 1 and Section 7.40,
chapter 7, page 6

15

li

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

F. W I L L I A M McGINN II,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

\
J

v.

I Case No.
/

UTAH POWER & LIGHT
C O M P A N Y , a Maine corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

13619

I
\
J

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
This is an action for personal injuries
the plaintiff when the mast of a sailboat
others were carrying from a county road
shore of Bear Lake (in Idaho) came in
defendant's electric power line.

sustained by
he and four
to the north
contact with
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D I S P O S I T I O N IN L O W E R COURT
The case was submitted to the jury pursuant to
the Idaho comparative negligence statute. The jury
found the plaintiff sixty (60%) percent negligent and
the defendant forty (40%) percent negligent. The
lower court entered a judgment of no cause of action.
Plaintiff's motion for new trial was granted. Defendant's petition for an intermediate appeal to this court
was granted.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the order granting a
new trial and reinstatement of the judgment of no
cause of action.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action for personal injuries arose out of an
accident that occurred on the north shore of Bear Lake
in Bear Lake County, Idaho, on July 23, 1972.
The defendant owns and operates a pumping plant
at the north end of Bear Lake which is commonly
known as Camp Lifton (Exs. 36-D, 38-D and 43-D;
R. 434). The pumping plant is used to pump water
out of Bear Lake into the North Lake and Bear River
to be used for irrigation and hydroelectric generation
(R. 731, P . 509). There is a county road which traverses the causeway at the north end of Bear Lake
(Exs. 32-D, 34-D, 48-D). The causeway separates
2
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Bear Lake from North Lake. The Idaho State Park is
located on the north shore of Bear Lake approximately
three-quarters of a mile east of Camp Lifton (Ex. 48D ; It. 442). The state park is located on land owned by
the defendant and leased to the State of Idaho (Exs.
80-D, 81-D, 82-D). The park is equipped with facilities
such as picnic tables, culinary water, rest rooms, charcoal grills and a boat jetty with a cement ramp on the
end which is used to launch boats (Exs. 19-D, 20-D; It.
436). Kirk Rich, who was employed by the Idaho Department of Parks as a park ranger at the Idaho State
Park during the summers of 1970, 1971 and 1972, testified he had seen hundreds of boats launched from the
boat jetty (R. 455). The Idaho State Park has been
a public facility since 1963 (R. 445). The boat jetty
was constructed in 1964 and 1965 (R. 455). The state
park is approximately one and three-quarters miles in
length (R. 435).
Although camping and boating facilities were
available in the Idaho State Park east of Camp Lifton,
the accident occurred in an area just west of Camp
Lifton. This area is also owned by the defendant (R.
228). The area west of Camp Lifton is "sandy and
hilly" and covered with weeds (R. 689, 664). There
are three separate power lines which run parallel to
the north shore of Bear Lake west of Camp Lifton
(Exs. 32-D, 34-D). There is a "230 KV line" which
crosses the county road just west of Camp Lifton and
is located along the north side of the county road, a
"12 KV line" which is located along the south side of
3
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the county road and a "46 KV line" which is located
further south of the county road (R. 733-734, P . 511512; Exs. 32-D, 34-D).
The mast of the boat being carried by the plaintiff
and his companions came in contact with the 46 KV line
(Ex. 43-D).
The 46 KV line was originally constructed in 1913
and rebuilt on the same alignment in 1957 (R. 784, P .
586). The National Electric Safety Code, which controls the construction and maintenance of electric power
lines, requires a minimum vertical clearance of 21 feet at
sixty degrees temperature for a 46 KV line (R. 784, P .
586). The line in question was constructed to provide
26 feet of vertical clearance at 120 degrees temperature
(R. 784, P . 586).
The 46 KV line, as built, exceeded the vertical
clearance requirements of the National Electric Safety
Code by five feet at twice the temperature (R. 784, P .
586). This clearance existed on the date of the accident.
(R. 712, P . 490). The 46 KV line is inspected by fixedwing aircraft every month, by helicopter once every six
months and by walking inspection once every year (R.
329). The annual walking inspection was performed on
July 10, 1972 (R. 330). There were no defects found
in this section of the line (R. 330-331).
Two weeks before the accident happened, Richard
Ricks (hereinafter "Ricks"), a friend of the plaintiff
F . William McGinn (hereinafter "McGinn"), drove to
Bear Lake to find a camp site (R. 691). Ricks drove
4
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through the Idaho State Park and observed the facilities but decided it would be crowded over the July 24th
weekend. H e selected the area west of Camp Lifton
for the weekend party (R. 692). Ricks made a map
of the north end of the lake and indicated the camp site
on the map (R. 577). The map was given to McGinn
(R. 577).
There were no camping or boating facilities west
of Camp Lifton (R. 459-460). However, people did
use the area for picnicking and swimming particularly
on holiday weekends when the state park was crowded
(R. 438). Local people from St. Charles, Paris or
Montpelier, Idaho, made daytime use of the area (R.
725, P . 503). There were no Utah Power and Light
signs in the area west of Camp Lifton (R. 438, 542).
None of the witnesses who testified had ever seen
a boat carried from the county road to the lake west
of Camp Lifton.
On Saturday evening, July 22, 1972, McGinn and
his date, Sarah Gittens (hereinafter "Gittens"), drove
to Bear Lake in McGinn's car (R. 577). Ricks and his
date, Lana Omura (hereinafter "Omura") drove to
Bear Lake in Ricks' car (R. 683). Ricks was pulling
a motorboat behind his automobile (R. 684). James
McNeil (hereinafter "McNeil") drove to Bear Lake
alone in his car trailing the catamaran sailboat which
was involved in the accident (R. 643; Exs. 47-D, 50D ) . McGinn and Ricks and McNeil are all fraternity
brothers (R. 616).
53
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McGinn was not able to locate the camp site from
the map but met Ricks in the Idaho State Park (R.
639). Ricks directed McGinn out of the state park to
the area west of Camp Lifton (R. 635-636). McGinn
and Gittens slept on the beach in an area approximatelyhalf way between the county road and water's edge
(Ex. 57-D). This area is almost directly under the 46
KV line. Ricks and Omura slept near the water's edge
so they could secure the motorboat which he had
launched at the Utah State Park (on the west side of
Bear Lake) and brought to their camp site. McNeil
slept on the trampoline on his sailboat which was parked
just south of the county road (R. 646; Ex. 57-D).
Gittens testified that just before she went to sleep
she "noticed" a buzzing sound (R. 636). She asked
McGinn, "what is that buzzing noise?" H e answered,
"Must be power lines or something." She stated they
thought the buzzing was coming from power lines that
were running across the road (R. 636). McGinn testified that Gittens had noticed the humming and asked,
"What is that buzzing?" McGinn answered, "It is
high voltage." (R. 581) McGinn was an employee of
Yates Electric at the time of the accident (R. 574A
(missed in pagination)).
McNeil testified he could hear the power lines humming as he went to sleep (R. 665-666). H e realized
there was a power line between himself and the road
(R. 668).
Omura admitted on cross-examination that she remembered being aware of power lines (R. 687).
6
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Ricks testified he observed the "power lines" that
were in the area west of Camp Lifton (R. 696), H e
stated he could hear the buzzing when he was down on
the beach (R. 696). Ricks said he knew the buzzing
sound meant there were some electrical lines in the
area (R. 697).
McGinn had been sailing before with McNeil at
Willard Bay. They launched the sailboat there from
the public ramp (R. 628).
When they awoke the next morning at about eightthirty, it was a clear day (R. 623). They put the sleeping bags in the car, then McNeil and McGinn drove
west on the county road to a store and service station
(R, 582-583). The county road is bordered on the
north by the 230 KV line, on the south by the 12 KV
line and goes under the 46 KV line approximately one
and a half miles west of Camp Lifton (R. 781-782, P .
583-584, Exs. 34-D, 32-D). When McGinn and McNeil returned to the camp site, they decided to put the
mast up on the sailboat atid carry it down to the lake
(R. 583). The mast is 26 feet long (R. 677; Exs. 47 D,
50-D). It can be "stepped" while the boat is on the
trailer or on the beach (R. 660-661). After the mast
was in place, Ricks and McNeil got on one side of the
boat, McGinn, Omura and Gittens got on the other side
and they proceeded to carry the 315 pound boat toward
the lake (R. 584). As they carried the boat toward the
lake, the mast hit the 46 KV line (R. 584). There are
weld marks about six inches down from the top of the
mast where it hit the power line (R. 652; Exs. 53-D,
7
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55-D). The electricity apparently went through the
aluminum mast, an aluminum tiller, then through McGinn to ground. The accident happened at about 9:38
a.m. (R. 742, P . 521). The point where the mast hit
the power line was 193 feet west of the two poles (structures) shown on the right hand side of Exhibits 37-D
and 43-D. The red and yellow fiberglass measuring
pole in Exhibits 37-D and 43-D is located at the approximate point where the mast struck the power line
(R. 711, P . 489). The power line was 29 feet one inch
above the ground at this point (R. 712, P . 490).
McGinn was taken to the hospital in Montpelier,
Idaho, and then to the University of Utah Medical
Center in Salt Lake City.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the court
ruled that McGinn was not a trespasser as a matter of
law; that the jury would not be advised of the effect
of their answers to the questions involved; that plaintiff could amend the general prayer from $350,000 to
$500,000 and that there was insufficient evidence to
submit an issue of punitive damages to the jury (R.
815). Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was
denied (R. 895). The case was submitted to the jury
on the issue of the defendant's and plaintiff's negligence. The jury returned a special verdict as follows:
(R. 88).
SPECIAL VERDICT
We, the jury, find, by a preponderance of the evidence, in this case the following answers to the questions
propounded to us:
8
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Q U E S T I O N NO. 1. Was the defendant Utah
Power & Light Company guilty of negligence which
was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries?
Yes X

No

Q U E S T I O N NO. 2. Was the plaintiff F . William McGinn I I guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of his injuries?
Y
x No
If you answer "y e s " to either of the prior questions, then answer the next questions.
Q U E S T I O N NO. 3. Considering all the negligence that caused the accident to be one hundred percent,
what percentage is attributable to:
(a)

The defendant Utah Power & Light
Company
40%

(b)

The plaintiff F . William McGinn 60%
TOTAL:

100%

Q U E S T I O N NO. 4. Disregarding any of the
previous answers, what is the total amount of damages
sustained by plaintiff F . William McGinn I I as a result of the incident ?
(a)
(b)

General damages including
lost wages

$150,000.00

Special damages

$ 18,150.00
TOTAL:

$168,150.00

/ s / Marie H . McDonald
Foreman

Date: December 3, 1973
9
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Based on the jury's answers to the special verdict,
the court entered judgment of no cause of action (R.
81). Defendant's motion to strike the affidavits or in
the alternative to obtain counteraffidavits was denied
(R. 15). Plaintiff's motion for new trial was granted
on the grounds the jury should have been advised of
the affect of the comparative negligence and should have
been advised there is no relationship between the damage
answer and the percentages (R. 16). Defendant's petition to this court for an interlocutory appeal was
granted (R. 2).
POINT I
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D IN GRANTI N G P L A I N T I F F ' S M O T I O N FOR A N E W
TRIAL.
Under the Idaho comparative negligence law, a jury
should not be informed of the effect their answers to
the special verdict will have on the final outcome of the
case.
Before the trial in this case commenced, the parties,
through their respective counsel, agreed that since this
accident occurred on the Idaho side of Bear Lake, this
matter would be tried under the Idaho comparative
negligence law. During the trial, a question of law
arose relating to whether or not the jury should be informed of the effect of their answers to the special interrogatories which would be submitted under the provisions of the Idaho comparative negligence law. Although there was no controlling Idaho decision on
this issue to guide the trial judge at the time of the
10
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trial, (November 26 through December 3, 1973) he
followed the general rule that the jury should not be
informed of the effect of their answers to the special
interrogatories. However, on March 7, 1974, the Supreme Court of Idaho in Holland v. Peterson,
Idaho
, 518 P.2d 1190 (1974) ruled that in a
case tried under comparative negligence, the trial court
must not instruct the jury as to what effect their
answers will have on the final outcome of the case.
"Appellant's final assignment of error is that
the trial court erred in instructing the jury that
they should not concern themselves with whether
their answers to the interrogatories submitted to
them would be favorable to one party or another.
The general rule, and the one that we adopt today, is that it is reversible error for the trial court
to instruct the jury as to the effect their answers
will have on the final outcome of the case. See
Annot. 90 ALR2d 1041, (1963). Of course, it
may not always be possible to frame the interrogatories in language that won't tend to inform
the jury of the effect, but they should never be
instructed what it will be." (Emphasis added)
The Idaho Supreme Court's decision on this issue is
in accord with nearly all of the other comparative negligence jurisdictions. Wisconsin clearly does not permit
the jury to be informed of the effect of its answers to
the special verdict. Fehrman v. Smirl, 121 N.W.2d
255 (Wis. 1963) was a malpractice case where the
judgment for the defendant was reversed because of
instructions which tended to inform the jury of the result of its answers to the special verdict. The instruction read:
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"You are further insrtucted that it is the duty
of the patient to follow the reasonable instructions and submit to the reasonable treatment prescribed by his physician or surgeon. If he fails
in his duty, and his act or omission directly contributes to the injury or disability, he cannot
maintain an action for malpractice against his
physician or surgeon, who is also guilty of an
act or omission in treating the case." Id. at 265.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated:
"Furthermore, because of the use of the phrase
'cannot maintain an action for malpractice,' this
instruction is highly objectionable because it
tends to inform the jury of the legal effect of
their answer to a question of the special verdict.
Two other attacked instructions, which were
given with respect to the jury's answering Question One of the special verdict, were also objectionable because couched in terms which tended
to inform the jury of the legal effect of answering Question One of the special verdict 'y es »' " Id.
at 265.
In Erb v. Mutual Service Casualty Company, 123
N.W.2d 493 (Wis. 1963), the attorney for the plaintiff
informed the jury in his argument that if it answered
a special interrogatory regarding whether an automobile had been sold in the affirmative, the insurance
policy on the automobile would be void. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held the attorney's comment "indefensively improper" and stated:
"The argument of counsel, however, was calculated to inform the jury of the effect of their
answer, and under the facts in the instant action
were sufficiently prejudicial so as to affect the
12
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substantial rights of Mutual Service, warranting
the granting of a new trial. . . . Id. at 469.
In Gardner v. Germain, 117 N.W.2d 759 (Minn.
1962), an automobile death case, the court held that it
was reversible error to disclose to the jury the legal
effect of the findings when a special verdict is employed. Accordingly, the court could not be concerned
with what the jury hoped the outcome of the case
would be and could not grant a new trial based upon a
juror's affidavit that when the jury found both the
plaintiff and the defendant negligent, it believed the
plaintiff would recover. See also McCourtie v. United
States Steel Corp., 93 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1958);
Flick v. Walfinger, 198 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1972);
and Johnson v. O'Brien, 105 N.W.2d 244 (Minn.
1960).
In Harbison v. Briggs Bros. Paint Manufacturing
Co., 354 S.W.2d 464 (Tenn. 1962), an action for personal injuries, the court analyzed the Tennessee special
verdict statute and held that "it is error for the judge
to inform the jury of the effect their answers may have
upon the case because such information would almost
necessarily defeat the object to be secured by the answers to such interrogatories." Id. at 471.
Argo v. Blackshear, 416 S.W.2d 314 (Ark. 1967)
was an action by the parents of a deceased child against
a motorist who struck and killed the child as she ran
across the highway. The case was submitted to the jury
under a special verdict as required by the Arkansas
comparative negligence statute. The jury returned with
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a finding of equal negligence on both the plaintiff and
defendant. The attorney for the plaintiff then requested that the trial judge ascertain whether the jury
intended for the parents to recover. The judge then
informed the jury that, under the law, the finding of
equal negligence barred any recovery by the plaintiffs.
The jury then returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and held
that it was error for the trial judge to specifically inform the jurors of the effect on the ultimate judgment
of their answers to the specially submitted questions.
The court stated:
"When the jury was polled and further questioned by the judge as to their intentions in answering the interrogatories, at no place did they
retract the findings on total damages and apportionment of negligence. The only additional
information supplied was to the effect that they
wanted to see plaintiffs recover the full $18,000.
This pointedly illustrates the value of interrogatories. Jurors honestly answer four relatively
simple questions, not knowing the legal effect
will be contrary to their personal wishes. Additionally, this situation justifies the rule that for
the judge to specifically inform the jurors as to
the effect of their answers on the ultimate judgment is reversible error. 90 A.L.R.2d 1041. As
said by this court in Wright v. Convey, 233 Ark.
798, 349 S.W.2d 344 (1961) : 'The reason for the
rule is that the special interrogatories are intended to elicit the jury's unbiased judgment
upon the issues of fact, and this purpose might
be frustrated if the jurors are in a position to
frame their answers with a conscious desire to
aid one side or the other.' "
14
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See also International Harvester Co. v. Pike, 466
S.W.2d 901 (Ark. 1971) where the court reversed and
remanded a judgment for the plaintiff on the basis that
it was error for the plaintiff's attorney to advise the
jury that an affirmative answer to the assumption of
risk interrogatory would preclude recovery by the plaintiff.
The only case which appellants have been able to
locate that holds the jury should be informed of the
effect of their answers to the special verdict interrogatories is a decision by an intermediate court in Colorado, Simpson v. Anderson, (Docket No. 73-009, Colorado Court of Appeals, 1973). This case is currently on
appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, but there has
been no decision by that court as of the date of this
brief. Therefore, this Colorado intermediate appellate
court's decision should not be taken as reliable precedent, especially when compared to the well reasoned
decisions from courts of final determination, including
Idaho's, which directly contravene this case.
The leading work in the field of comparative negligence is the Comparative Negligence Manual, a practical treatise of the law in this area. This book was
written by two of the leading experts in comparative
negligence law, Carroll R. Heft and C. James Heft.
These two practicing Wisconsin attorneys have wide
experience in working with comparative negligence,
since Wisconsin has had a law similar to Idaho's and
Utah's for many years. The authors of this treatise
state that a jury should act solely as a fact finding body
15
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and should not be informed of the legal effect of its
answers.
"The special verdict is the very cornerstone of
the comparative negligence concept, and the jury
does not, and should not, know the legal effect
and result of its answers to the interrogatories.
By using the procedure of a special verdict
under comparative negligence, a jury finds the
facts without regard to the ultimate outcome of
the case. The court takes the facts as found by
the jury and awards judgment. The procedure
is intended to ascertain the truth untainted by
prejudice or desire to see one of the parties win
or lose." . . . Id. Section 8.10, chapter 8, page 1.
"It is obvious that meticulous care should be
exercised in not informing the jury of the effect
of their answers upon the final outcome of the
case. Care must be exercised by counsel in argument. Care must be exercised by the court in the
wording of the questions and in the instructions.
It is one of the cornerstones of comparative
negligence that the jury be limited to a fact finding body. The interpretation of those facts is
for the court. Likewise, the application of the
apportionment question to the entire damages
found by the jury is likewise the duty of the
court in the doing of the mathematics." Id. Section 7.40, chapter 7, page 6.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that Holland v.
Peterson, the Idaho comparative negligence case discussed supra, is controlling in this case. When this recent Idaho decision is considered, together with all the
16
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other precedent from comparative negligence jurisdictions, it is clear that one of the fundamental bases of
comparative negligence with its special verdict provisions is that the jury should act solely as a fact finding body. They should make their factual determinations without the sympathy, bias and prejudice which
would be inherent if the jury knew the plaintiff could
not recover unless they found the defendant at least
5 1 % negligent. In McGinn v. Utah Power & Light,
the jury, acting as fact finders, determined that the
plaintiff was guilty of the greater negligence. Unaware
of the effect their answers would have on the damages
awarded, the jury made a clear determination that the
plaintiff was guilty of the greater fault. Under the
Idaho comparative negligence law, as under the new
Utah comparative negligence law, the plaintiff recovers
nothing when the jury determines that he was guilty
of the greater negligence. On this basis, the trial judge's
grant of a new trial should be reversed and the jury
verdict and judgment of no cause of action reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, Q U I N N E Y & N E B E K E R
Stephen B. Nebeker
Paul S. Felt
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Sidney G. Baucom
M. Blaine Hofeling
1407 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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